The example [melody does not equal sound] shows that there are concepts which direct our mental states but which can play no part in an explanatory [scientific] theory, because they divide the world into the wrong kinds of kind—concepts like those of ornament, melody, duty, freedom. The concept of the person is such a concept, which does not mean that there are no persons, but only that a scientific theory of human persons will classify them with other things—for example, with apes or mammals….
Roger Scuton, The Face of God
We use groupings all the time. Problems arise, however, when we fail to recognize that frequently we are using the wrong kind of grouping for the question posed. To be grouped, whatever is in the group must have some similarity; we don’t group “turtle” with “rough” because one has nothing to do with the other. Science groups as it does because the scientific project requires it to be organized that way—it has utility for the scientist. Groupings can shift as understanding shifts. For example taxonomy is changing as we shift from association by appearance to association by related genetic characteristics. There is no “right” way to do taxonomy; the scientist simply decides what grouping has the most utility.
It is an error to presume that the scientist’s grouping has the same degree of utility for other types of questions, e.g., to understand interpersonal relationships (which might better be considered by art, e.g., King Lear). When we do that, we treat subjects, you or me, like an object, e.g., a hydrogen atom, and this is error of the gravest sort. It confuses material things with subjective things; the scientist judges how to organize people who are objects for the purposes of her taxonomy; the scientist loves her husband when she gets home.
A friend of mine recently made a suggestion that I think is helpful in thinking about this problem. He noted that we apprehend the world in two ways, objectively and subjectively. The world that we apprehend objectively is a world that we measure in one way or another; the world that we apprehend subjectively, we simply experience. The objective world is shared and measuring is simply an agreed way of talking about it; hypothesizing simply attempts to predict what future measurements might be. The subjective world is lonely, and we can only assume that others who appear to be like ourselves have similar experiences. The objective worldview can demand proof; the subjective world is proof. Thus, when we group things that we can measure, we can group only by our measurements; when we group our subjective experience, we can only judge the experiences as similar. Thus, the two ways of apprehending the world cannot be treated as knowledge of same type because that makes an error of category; we mix apples and orange.
Blog No. 51: Objective and Subjective Experience
The example [melody does not equal sound] shows that there are concepts which direct our mental states but which can play no part in an explanatory [scientific] theory, because they divide the world into the wrong kinds of kind—concepts like those of ornament, melody, duty, freedom. The concept of the person is such a concept, which does not mean that there are no persons, but only that a scientific theory of human persons will classify them with other things—for example, with apes or mammals….
Roger Scuton, The Face of God
We use groupings all the time. Problems arise, however, when we fail to recognize that frequently we are using the wrong kind of grouping for the question posed. To be grouped, whatever is in the group must have some similarity; we don’t group “turtle” with “rough” because one has nothing to do with the other. Science groups as it does because the scientific project requires it to be organized that way—it has utility for the scientist. Groupings can shift as understanding shifts. For example taxonomy is changing as we shift from association by appearance to association by related genetic characteristics. There is no “right” way to do taxonomy; the scientist simply decides what grouping has the most utility.
It is an error to presume that the scientist’s grouping has the same degree of utility for other types of questions, e.g., to understand interpersonal relationships (which might better be considered by art, e.g., King Lear). When we do that, we treat subjects, you or me, like an object, e.g., a hydrogen atom, and this is error of the gravest sort. It confuses material things with subjective things; the scientist judges how to organize people who are objects for the purposes of her taxonomy; the scientist loves her husband when she gets home.
A friend of mine recently made a suggestion that I think is helpful in thinking about this problem. He noted that we apprehend the world in two ways, objectively and subjectively. The world that we apprehend objectively is a world that we measure in one way or another; the world that we apprehend subjectively, we simply experience. The objective world is shared and measuring is simply an agreed way of talking about it; hypothesizing simply attempts to predict what future measurements might be. The subjective world is lonely, and we can only assume that others who appear to be like ourselves have similar experiences. The objective worldview can demand proof; the subjective world is proof. Thus, when we group things that we can measure, we can group only by our measurements; when we group our subjective experience, we can only judge the experiences as similar. Thus, the two ways of apprehending the world cannot be treated as knowledge of same type because that makes an error of category; we mix apples and orange.